Chapter 6
Intersectionality, Citizenship, and Activism

By Jacqueline Kennelly (Carleton University)

[A] Learning Objectives

- To gain insight into the gendered elements of citizenship, and how these intersect with race, class, dis/ability, sexuality and age.
- To understand how neoliberalism has become a prominent ideological force in Canada and globally, and the effects this has on gendered citizenship practices and civic engagement.
- To make connections between gendered analyses of citizenship and the ongoing ‘war on terror’ and rise of the security state.
- To examine alternative forms of citizenship, such as sexual citizenship and Indigenous citizenship, and consider how these forms intersect with gender.
- To apply the intersectional analysis of gendered citizenship to youth citizenship and social movement engagement.

[A] Introduction

When you hear the word “person,” who do you see in your mind's eye? A man? A woman? What age is that person? What ethnicity? Are they able-bodied? As sociologists, we know that language is a powerful force for including people or for leaving them out. One of the most famous cases about gender inclusion and exclusion in Canadian history is about who is and is not a “person.” Remarkably, the question was an open one as to whether women fit within this particular category.
The British North America Act (BNA) of 1867 set out the domains of the provincial and federal governments and within that act, any time that the concept represented by the plural term “persons” was referred to in the singular, the word “he” was used. On this basis, many argued that women did not qualify as “persons” in the full, legal sense. Some took this even further to suggest that the very wording of the BNA implied that women lacked the capacity to carry out important public duties. This was the charge made against Emily Murphy, the first female magistrate in the British Empire, and the head of a newly created women’s court in Edmonton, Alberta. Although Alberta had granted women the right to vote in 1916, Judge Murphy’s authority was continually challenged on the basis of whether or not she could be considered a “person,” and thus be capable of adequately carrying out her work. While Alberta ultimately accepted that women are “persons,” for many years it was the only jurisdiction in Canada to do so.

In 1927, Emily Murphy and four other Canadian women living in Edmonton at the time—Nellie McClung, Irene Parlby, Louise McKinney, and Henrietta Muir Edwards—decided to push the case of women’s status as “persons” to the federal level, seeking an answer to the question of whether women could become part of the Senate. Much to their shock, the Supreme Court ruled that women could not, in fact, be considered “persons,” in that they were seen as lacking the competency to serve on the Senate. The five women appealed this decision, taking their case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain, which was, at the time, the court of final appeal throughout the British Empire. The Privy Council reversed the ruling on 29 October 1929. In his summary of their decision, the Lord Chancellor Viscount Sankey wrote that, “[t]he exclusion of women from all public offices is a relic of days more barbarous than ours,” and that “to those who ask why the word [person] should include females, the obvious answer is why should it not.” These five women later came to be known as the “Famous Five;” their images are now immortalized in identical statues on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, and in downtown Calgary, Alberta.

Less than a century later, current legal and political conditions do not place any “official” barriers to women’s full inclusion in democratic citizenship in Canada, yet the world of politics remains deeply gendered. This is true of both formal electoral politics and more informal political venues such as those of non-governmental organizations and
The “persons” case is significant, not only as a historical process that fundamentally transformed gender relations in the Canadian political sphere, but also as a reminder of the struggles that have led to certain taken-for-granted elements of citizenship in liberal democracies. The gendering of politics means more than simply the exclusion of women— it can also mean the exclusion of those who do not embody hegemonic forms of masculinity, no matter their gender (Schippers, 2007; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). The “persons” who were considered worthy of democratic inclusion in this case were men who embodied masculine hegemony. They were men of some means—one of the requirements for serving on the Senate was that a man ought to have at least $4000 in his possession. They were white men—Indigenous men were excluded, as were racialized immigrant men, such as migrants from China or India. Once women were granted the rights of democratic participation implied by the “persons” case, they too were limited by what Schippers describes as hegemonic femininity. Women who were working class, Indigenous, racialized, disabled, and/or queer were, and continue to be, at a disadvantage in the world of politics. Finally, the very definition of citizenship was, and is, strongly associated with age—in other words, young people are at a disadvantage in exercising their citizenship rights, which are broadly conceived as becoming available only after a person reaches the age of majority (generally at age 18).

In this chapter, we will explore how citizenship, democracy, and public participation in Canada are gendered, and how gender intersects with other categories such as race or ethnicity, social class, dis/ability, and age. First, we will consider the contributions made by feminist theorists in sociology and other disciplines to understanding some of the gendered, racialized, classed, and other exclusionary aspects of so-called “universal” concepts of liberal democratic participation. Next, we will review more contemporary debates about the shift, in Canada and elsewhere, away from a liberal democratic model, and address the cultural, social, and political changes wrought by the recent ideological upsurge of neoliberalism. Looking again at feminist critiques, we will then explore what neoliberalism means for the gendering of current forms of citizenship, and for young women’s citizenship in particular. We will also discuss feminist critiques of ideological shifts within many liberal democracies, including the “war on terror” and the rise of the security state. Additionally, we will consider alternative understandings of citizenship.
such as sexual citizenship, and the complexities of Indigenous citizenship in a colonialist state.

Finally, in this chapter, we will address other forms of democratic engagement, especially those emerging from social movements. Here, we shall focus specifically on young women’s activist participation in Canada and elsewhere, considering how gender and its intersections continue to shape young women’s civic involvement.

[A] Citizenship as an exclusionary term

Common sense understandings of citizenship associate it with concepts like “inclusion” or “belonging.” Dig a little deeper and you might draw a connection between citizenship and rights and responsibilities, or as membership in a particular nation-state. Feminists and other critical scholars, however, have done a lot of work to unpack the concept of citizenship, and reveal the ways in which it is often quite exclusionary and certainly does not denote membership for all. Using an intersectional lens that teases out the different modalities by which it happens, in this section we will explore how citizenship can, in fact, mean exclusion. While recognizing (as intersectionality does) that the different modes of exclusion often happen simultaneously, and in interlocking fashion, for the sake of clarity, we have isolated some of the main categories that have been analyzed by academics. We begin by looking at gender.

[B] Gendered citizenship

Feminist debates have been waged over many decades about the value of fighting for citizenship, as a concept. At heart is the question of whether citizenship, as a term that until recently explicitly excluded women, can ever be truly reconciled with its promised ideal of ensuring universal rights and accessibility to all. As Ruth Lister, a prominent feminist theorist of citizenship, notes, “While not denying the ways in which legal definitions of citizenship and citizenship practices can exclude, …. as an ideal it can also provide a potent weapon in the hands of disadvantaged and oppressed groups” (2003, 5).

Feminist scholars have identified two ways that the supposedly gender-neutral term “citizenship” is inextricably gendered: through commonly-held assumptions about
the masculine characteristics of a “citizen,” and through the arbitrary divisions between public and private demanded by liberal citizenship (Durish 2002; Lister 2003; Nash 2010; Phillips 1993). At the root of contemporary citizenship in liberal democracies, like Canada’s, lies the concept of the free, equal, and rational individual, capable of participating in the capitalist market through the uncoerced contractual exchange of goods and services. As Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman (1998, 95) point out, “Logically, there is no good reason why a liberal theorist should exclude females from this category; in practice, and in most liberal political theory, for three centuries the ‘free and equal individual’ has been a male.” They trace this assumption to the influence of patriarchal family relations, which have shaped the social world for centuries. In patriarchal societies, women (and children) are considered the naturally subordinate, submissive extension of the “man of the household,” whose responsibilities include protecting and providing for his family; women are not given rights equal to those of men. Traditional liberal views of citizenship have also condemned women to subordinate status because of the longstanding cultural association of women with irrationality, vulnerability, and nature—in opposition to that of men with society and civilization. As Lister expands, “it has been the very identification of women with the body, nature and sexuality, feared as a threat to the political order, that has rendered them ineligible” (2003, 72) for equal citizenship. The essentialist view that men are “naturally” rational and independent, whereas women are “naturally” emotional and dependent, is fundamentally connected to the division between the public sphere (the political world of the state, public policy, and paid work) and the private sphere (the domestic world of the home and family). Feminist scholars have worked to disrupt this binary opposition, pointing out the interdependency of the public and private, and revealing the slippage between the two “spheres” (Lister 2003; Okin 1998).

Perhaps the quintessential articulation of the feminist challenge to the concept of oppositional public and private spheres is the well-known second-wave rallying cry: “the personal is political.” This slogan represents the transition of feminist thinking, from its prevailing assumption in the first-wave that women’s close association with the domestic sphere was natural and inevitable—a belief that they somehow reconciled with their fights for increasing women’s emancipation in the public realm—to its investigation of
the interconnections between women’s domestic roles and their ongoing inequality and exclusion from the public worlds of work and politics (Okin 1998). For the most part, feminists were not (and are not) calling for the complete dissolution of the division between the public and the private; many feminists recognize the value of a protected private sphere for both women and men, as well as the importance of challenging inequality in the public spheres of work and politics for all (Lister 2003; Okin 1998; Young 1990). However, they have simultaneously worked towards challenging the entrenched dichotomy between public and private, as an important component of challenging gender inequality.

One example of how feminist analyses of the interconnection between the public and private spheres can help to illuminate contemporary gender inequalities lies in the study of women’s massive under-representation in formal politics. Despite the fact that Canadian women have been legally able to run for political office for almost a century, as of 1 June 2016, only 26 per cent of seats in the Canadian parliament were held by women. Although Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made headlines by insisting on gender parity within his cabinet in November 2015 (Ditchburn 2015), Canada’s ranking for female representation in parliament has actually dropped since 2010; sitting at fiftieth in 2010, Canada is now at sixty-third, coming behind countries such as Afghanistan (fiftieth) and Iraq (fifty-eighth). Canada compares well to our neighbours to the south, however; the United States ranked at ninety-sixth for women in parliament in June of 2016. The top country for gender equality in 2016, in terms of electoral representation, is Rwanda, followed by Bolivia and Cuba.ii Clearly, it is possible for countries to rank well in terms of gender representation regardless of their GDP or reputations for gender inequality, and we must seek a different explanation for Canada’s ongoing gender inequality in politics.

In a study of Canadian women parliamentarians who held office between 1945 and 1975, Janine Brodie (1985) reveals that two major factors prevent women from running for office and from being elected if they do run. The first is the ongoing undervaluing of women’s work, both paid and unpaid. Women’s paid work tends to be seen as “less than” that of men, and leads to less prestige and opportunities for advancement; this puts women at a distinct disadvantage when they are running for
office. The second is the ongoing unequal division of labour in the home; women continue to shoulder the majority of this work, which leaves them with less time to pursue electoral politics. While this study is now almost 30 years old, its conclusions are still relevant today: the private worlds of home and family have a significant effect on the public worlds of politics and paid work.

In a more recent study of women’s political involvement in Canada, Linda Trimble and Jane Arscott (2003) identify another factor that constrains women’s political participation: the overwhelmingly masculinist culture of politics. Many of Canada’s legislatures, for example, were built without women’s washrooms close to the chamber, and in 1993, Liberal Member of Parliament Shaughnessy Cohen missed a vote in the House of Commons while she searched for the women’s washroom (Trimble and Arscott 2003). Less obvious, but perhaps more damaging, is the “chilly climate” created for women by their male colleagues in the House. Women are much more likely than men to be called derogatory, gendered names including “slut,” “cow,” and “bitch,” when they speak out in the legislature.iii In a 1997 Angus Reid/CBC poll of 102 female politicians across Canada, the women described “a working environment at times so hostile to their participation that it is experienced as emotionally abusive” (Trimble and Arscott 2003, 113). In May 2014, a young woman named Morgan Baskin, age 19, declared herself a candidate for the mayoral race in the City of Toronto. Shortly after her website was launched (www.morganbaskin.ca), she began to be sexually harassed via the email account attached to her website. She spoke out about this in an interview with Yahoo! news, noting that “it says so much about why we have so few women in politics.”iv A British Columbia based communications specialist launched a website in 2013 titled “Madame Premier” (http://madampremier.tumblr.com) to document instances of sexist commentary about female politicians in the media. Some of the examples posted include derogatory comments by newspaper columnists about BC Premier Christy Clark’s attire, as well as tweets about her breast size. Clearly, the “chilly climate” for women in politics extends far beyond the walls of legislatures and city halls.

When women are called “slut” or “bitch,” one can presume that these women have challenged hegemonic masculinity (Schippers 2007). This happens when women behave in ways that would be seen as acceptable in men, but are considered unacceptable in
women. For instance, when women are assertive or authoritative, they are more likely to be called a “bitch.” Being assertive and having authority, however, are important qualities in politics; this leaves women in a quandary when they enter the masculine world of parliamentary legislatures. The expectations of hegemonic gender also have an impact on men who are not seen to appropriately embody masculinity. For example, men who cry in public are not perceived to be good political leaders. In July of 2014, a video of a crying Japanese politician went viral, as he sought to explain his corrupt use of public funds. The sensation of the video was not his corruption; what made the video so popular was the spectacle of a male public figure crying uncontrollably before an audience. The politician resigned soon after. Whether his resignation was due to his illegal use of public funds, or his loss of status after his public crying stint, remains unclear.

Racialized citizenship

If women, as a group, are chronically under-represented in Canadian politics, women of colour are practically non-existent. Men of colour are also significantly under-represented. Trimble and Arscott point out that those women who do achieve political power typically belong to the dominant social categories; they are (or choose to represent themselves as) white, middle class, heterosexual, and able-bodied. This reflects the entrenchment of a climate of racialized exclusion within a society with a colonial history. In order to understand the effects of racialization, in Canada we need to expand our understanding of how policies and practices of exclusion pertain to Canadian citizenship.

One of the most cherished myths held by Canadians about our country is that we are a humanitarian and multicultural nation that promotes cross-racial harmony and diversity. We love to crow about our moral superiority in this regard, particularly in comparison to our influential neighbour to the south. But scratch the surface of Canadian history and it does not take long to see that this country was founded on racist and exclusionary beliefs that bolstered white people, while undermining Indigenous peoples and other racialized groups. Sunera Thobani suggests that “settler society” is a more accurate description of Canada than “liberal democracy” as it reflects the fact that “the political community of citizens is a community based in the legal negation of Aboriginal
sovereignty, with Aboriginal peoples today among the strangers and aliens who seek to defend their rights from the incursions of citizenship” (Thobani 2007, 73). She is one of many critical, feminist, anti-racist scholars in Canada who have critiqued the notion of Canadian citizenship as “inclusive,” extending feminist analyses beyond gender to also look at intersecting exclusions based on race (see also Abu-Laban 1998; Bannerji 2000; Jiwani 2006; Razack 2002).

Canadian students often do not learn about Canada’s multiple race-based exclusionary policies in public school. They do not encounter stories about the Chinese Exclusion Act or the case of the Komagata Maru until post-secondary education, if at all. While students might have marginally more exposure to stories about Aboriginal residential schools, at least if they were schooled in the last decade, the extent to which Indigenous peoples were subject to forced assimilation, displacement, and genocide are often underplayed. It is thus difficult, at times, to convince students of the reality of Canada’s history as a country that was built “for white men only.” As an example of how “easy it is for taken-for-granted categories to create exclusions,” Timothy Stanley describes a survey distributed by the Dominion Institute in 2001. One survey question asked, “in what decade in the twentieth century were Canadian women given the right to vote in elections?” Stanley explains that:

Here the answer being looked for is the 1910s. [T]his answer appears to make complete sense as it is indeed in this decade that the federal government and most provinces extended voting rights at general elections to women for the first time since 1867. However, in fact, this answer reduces “Canadians” to English speaking people of European origins. Women in Quebec got the right to vote in 1940, but in the logic of this question and answer they apparently are not “Canadian.” Nor are the Chinese, Japanese, and South Asian women “Canadian” who (along with their menfolk) got the right to vote federally and in certain provinces only in 1947-9. Nor, presumably, are the women “Canadian” who were so-called Status Indians and who did not get the right to vote federally until 1960, when all “status Indians” did. Similarly, the category “Canadian women” apparently does not include the women of the Iroquois Confederacy, who had been voting since at least the thirteenth century, only to have this right taken away by the Canadian government in the twentieth. [2006, 37]
This example hopefully illustrates why an intersectional approach is both useful and necessary in trying to unpack the complexity of Canadian citizenship and public participation. The project of building a white man’s country began with British colonial settlement policies, and involved both marginalizing Indigenous peoples and recruiting white people to settle on and develop the “new” land (Dua 2004). White women played a pivotal role in this process, and were recruited to become “mothers of the nation,” to “save” the white men who had gone before them from the dangers of rough backwoods living and intermarriage with Indigenous women (Perry 2004). Women of colour, on the other hand, played a distinctly different role as the “other” against whom white women ought to measure themselves. As Yasmin Jiwani notes, “In Canada’s history, it is evident that racialized women were used to consolidate the nation as a White settler society” (2006, 10). Women of colour were perceived as moral threats to the nation, and early suffragists fought against including them in the franchise, arguing that they would “pollute the purity of the nation” (Jiwani 2006, 10). Women of colour were more likely than men of colour to be excluded on the basis of immigration laws; whereas men were perceived to be useful to the growing Canadian nation as a source of cheap and exploitable labour, women were seen as a distraction and a threat to public health through their supposed fecundity and their presumed infection with sexually transmitted diseases (Jiwani 2006).

The complex intersections between race, gender, and Canadian citizenship can perhaps be best illustrated through an historical example, drawn from the work of Canadian scholar Enakshi Dua. Dua (2004) traces the debate over the admission of the first two Indian women to Canada in 1912. Popularly called the “Hindu Women’s Question” (or “HWQ”), the debate hinged on two key, contradictory impulses in the development of Canada as a white settler society: on the one hand, the desire to prevent Asian nationals from settling permanently in Canada, and on the other, the desire to maintain the “racial purity” of the white nation by preventing inter-racial relationships and the birth of mixed race children.

The first two Indian women to migrate to Canada were Kartar Kaur and Harman Kaur, who were the wives of Bhag Singh and Balwant Singh. Singh and Singh, who were Indian residents of Canada, were part of the Ghadar Party, an early resistance group
formed from within communities of colour that argued against British imperialism and white settler societies. One of the Ghadar Party’s strategies was to challenge immigration laws that prevented them from bringing their spouses from India to join them in Canada. White Canadians’ resistance to their admission was based on the belief that Indian women would be instrumental in creating “ethnic enclaves” within Canada, thus jeopardizing the white national imaginary. On the other hand, as more and more Indian men migrated to Canada to fill the need for cheap labour on nation-building projects such as the railway, it was feared that their presence in the country would potentially “endanger” white women through the supposed threat of sexual violence. It was also feared that they might form interpersonal relationships with white women, further threatening the homogeneity of the white settler society. This led some to believe that Indian wives ought to be permitted entry, in order to “protect” white women.

Bhag Singh, Balwant Singh, and the Ghadar party with which they were associated, fought the exclusion of their wives on the patriarchal basis that, as men, they were entitled to the “male right” to a wife and family. They likewise participated in the gendering of their spouses as the protectors of Indian community through their claims, and also made recourse to white Canadian settlers’ fears of interracial marriage in fighting for their cause. In an article published in one of the Ghadar newspapers, Sikh opponents of the anti-immigration laws made explicit links to the pressures Sikh men were under to not interact with white women: “He must not be guilty of an overt look, much less an overt act lest be considered a menace to our social society. Not many Europeans could stand the strain of similar conditions” (Dua 2004, 81).

This example illustrates the complex intersection between race, gender, and citizenship in Canada. On the one hand, neither Indian men nor Indian women were welcome in Canada, made clear through restrictive immigration policies and racist treatment upon their arrival. While the men were able to immigrate under the auspices of labour shortages, women’s immigration was much more restricted. When Indian-Canadian men began to advocate on behalf of their families to immigrate, they did so on the patriarchal basis that they had a “right” to a wife and family life, not on the basis of women’s individual rights to be free to immigrate to Canada under their own terms. The resistance from the white settler society to Indian women’s immigration was equally
complex. White settlers gendered Indian women as the purveyors of cultural norms and community building (which was seen as a negative trait in light of efforts to keep Canada white); they also stigmatized Indian men as being potentially sexually violent towards white Canadian women, or as creating an “impure” nation through inter-racial marriage and child-bearing. Neither gender nor race can be extracted from this account; both social categories are required to understand the layers with which the “Hindu Women’s Question” was addressed at the turn of the twentieth century.

[B]Other intersections: Class, Ability, Sexuality, and Age

An intersectional approach to understanding the exclusions of citizenship looks beyond gender and race to examine other social categories that affect different people’s capacity to participate fully in the Canadian state. Social class, dis/ability, sexuality, and age all play key, and often intersecting, roles in determining who can access the rights and entitlements of Canadian citizenship, and who cannot.

It ought not be surprising that poverty bears a negative relationship to one’s enactment of citizenship rights in Canada. Living in poverty poses substantial barriers to civic participation, and presents additional challenges that are often created by the state itself. For example, women living on welfare are subject to heightened surveillance and policing of their actions, family lives, and expenditures. This is accomplished through the increasingly draconian “welfare-to-work” schemes that have been introduced across Canada since the mid-nineties in response to neoliberal restructuring (Butterwick 2009; Caragata 2009). Poverty, while not unique to women, remains a gendered phenomenon: in 2003, 53 per cent of low-income Canadians were female. Moreover, single women, Indigenous women, immigrant women, women with disabilities, senior women, and women of colour are more likely than other women or than men, as a group, to be impoverished (Young 2009). The division between the public and private realms that has been identified by feminists as a problematic element of citizenship is particularly relevant to understanding the intersectionality of poverty. For instance, women on welfare are treated as “strains on the system,” who drain the public purse; their invisible labour in the private sphere as mothers, grandmothers, sisters, or daughters goes unrecognized (Gurstein and Vilches, 2009; Neysmith, Reisma-Street, Baker-Collins, and
Porter, 2009). With so much of their attention being focused on survival, it is especially difficult for those living in poverty to participate in civic engagement or political advocacy.

Women with disabilities are much more likely to be impoverished than women without disabilities or than men with or without disabilities. The Disabled Women’s Network of Canada (DAWN) notes that the unemployment rate for women with disabilities is as high as 75 per cent while the unemployment rate for men with disabilities is 60 per cent. What this means in terms of access to citizenship entitlements is that women with disabilities are more often isolated from the wider community, and thus from political engagement. Likewise, their poverty ensures that they face similar barriers to civic involvement as do impoverished women without disabilities. The unfortunate irony of this is that both poor women and women living with disabilities form the two groups who most need to be engaged in political activism in order to enact changes; their views and voices are chronically overlooked, which reproduces the very structures that created, and now sustain, their marginalization.

Sexuality is also a significant factor in the enactment of Canadian citizenship rights. As discussed in detail in previous chapters, sexuality and gender are tightly interconnected in our society. The “heterosexual matrix” (Butler 1990) requires men to relate to women as objects of sexual attraction, and vice versa, setting up gender as a binary of polar opposites. Those who transgress these norms are subject to discrimination, mistrust and mockery. Even in contemporary Canada, where marriage, adoption, spousal supports and spousal pensions have recently been legalized for same-sex couples, sexual citizenship rights have only been extended to those who emulate heterosexual monogamous relationships. As Brenda Cossman (2002) argues, members of sexual subcultures such as leather and BDSM (Bondage/Domination/Sado-Masochism) communities, and those who do not conform to the nuclear family model of two monogamous adults and their children (such as polyamorous or non-monogamous individuals) remain marginalized under Canadian law. As Cossman (2002, 485) notes, following British sociologist Diane Richardson, “the sexual citizen is a heterosexual citizen,” meaning that efforts to extend citizenship rights to non-heterosexuals has often taken the form of emulating normative heterosexual family practices. Given that
normative heterosexuality is tightly linked to the binary model of gender, as well as to
hegemonic forms of both masculinity and femininity, sexual citizenship is also a form of
gendered citizenship. A further discussion of sexual citizenship as an alternate to
mainstream citizenship follows later in this chapter.

Another category of exclusion in relation to citizenship is age. There are formal
restrictions imposed on civic involvement through such devices as voting ages (which in
Canada is typically 18), but there is also a wider, cultural assumption that young people
are less capable, rational, and responsible, in terms of their civic involvement. Across
Western democracies, over the last two decades or so, there has also been a rising moral
panic about young people’s supposed apathy in relation to civic engagement, as measured
by the dropping rate of voter participation amongst 18-30 year-olds (Pammett and LeDuc
2003). Institutional responses have included a surge in citizenship education across all of
Canada’s provinces as well as in other liberal democratic countries. The problem with
this kind of response is that these curricula tend to emphasize apolitical forms of
community engagement that do little to foster critical thinking or encourage students to
challenge injustices within the state (Kennelly and Llewellyn 2011; Llewellyn, Cook and
Molina 2010; Westheimer 2008). Indeed, a number of academics concerned with youth
citizenship have identified schooling as a force for creating “citizens-in-the-making”
rather than as actualized political forces in their own right (Gordon 2010; Kennelly
2011). How age intersects with gender, race, and other social categories to influence
young women’s civic engagement will be further explored below.

[A]Neoliberalism, gender, and the rise of the consumer citizen

Feminist theory extends beyond considering the manner in which social categories like
gender, race, and class, among others, intersect to restrict access to citizenship for some
members of the population. It has also engaged in a long and vigorous debate regarding
the political and economic roles of macrostructures (the state, corporations, and the
media, among others) in shaping citizenship and democracy in Canada and other liberal
democratic or settler states. Over the last three decades, feminists and other critical
Theorists have adopted the organizing concept of neoliberalism to make sense of these effects.

Neoliberalism, as a political rationality, is associated with the intensive deregulation of markets, the reduction or elimination of state interference in the economy, and the substantial retrenchment of government-funded social services programs such as healthcare, education, and welfare. Its critics charge that it tends to benefit corporations at the expense of workers, rich countries at the expense of poor countries, and affluent citizens at the expense of those living in poverty (Brown 2005; Dean 2009). After the global economic crash of 2008, which appeared to reveal the rotten underbelly of neoliberal policies, government responses involved massive bailouts of financial institutions, not of the individual homeowners and workers whose lives had been overturned by the crash. These measures, which sought to stabilize markets and protect capital interests, were highly consistent with neoliberal policy priorities (Braedley and Luxton 2010). Critiques of neoliberalism have laid at the heart of many of the major social movements that have emerged over the last 20 years, including the anti or alter-globalization movement, the Occupy movement, and the Quebec student strikes.

Neoliberalism has also been analyzed as a cultural and social rationality, shaping people’s experiences of themselves and of the world around them such that they begin to act in ways that reinforce neoliberal ideology. As Jodi Dean remarks, “to retain its dominant position neoliberalism as an ideological formation has to offer something to the people whose lives it shapes. It has to structure their expectations and desires so that it feels right, like the way things just are. It can’t say directly, ‘Hey, you guys, go work really hard so that the rich can get richer’” (2009, 50).

One aspect of neoliberalism, as a cultural formation, is its emphasis on shifting the duty of care away from the state and towards individuals. This is achieved ideologically through claims that “individuals and their families should take more responsibility for their own care, . . . . government provision of services is inefficient and costly, . . . . reliance on state services weakens individual initiative and undermines family and community ties, and . . . . caregiving is best arranged through voluntary familial and community networks” (Luxton 2010, 163). Not surprisingly, this shift in responsibility for care disproportionately affects women, and presents even more
hardships for women living in poverty or with a disability. As feminist economists have noted, the neoliberal ideological shift towards privatizing care effectively results in women’s unpaid labour substantially subsidizing the so-called “free market” (Neysmith et. al. 2009; Bezanson and Luxton 2006).

Another ideological aspect of neoliberalism that pertains to citizenship is the reduction of civic engagement to individualized acts of consumerism, which undermines notions of collective action and social solidarity (Brodie 2002). Nikolas Rose (1999) has identified how, since the eighties, consumption practices have become increasingly inseparable from notions of the “active citizen.” He argues that participation in a public sphere of democratic engagement is no longer expected, but rather, that citizen “action” has been reduced to practices of consumption that reinforce particular identity categories and styles. In this cultural milieu, the activity of the citizen “is to be understood in terms of the activation of the rights of the consumer in the marketplace” (Rose 1999, 165). Women, and particularly young women, are positioned in multiple ways in this transformation of citizenship rights into individualized consumerism: as pre-eminent consumers who are focused on self-fashioning, as cultural dupes who are particularly vulnerable to suggestions from advertising, and as consumable objects in and of themselves (Cronin 2000). As feminist cultural theorist Angela McRobbie (2008, 532) argues, consumer culture is a “force [that] is now accelerated and expanded with the effect that commercial values now occupy a critical place in the formation of the categories of youthful femininity. This appropriation of the site of girlhood actively draws on a quasi-feminist vocabulary which celebrates female freedom and gender equality.”

McRobbie illustrates this argument through an examination of the popular television show Sex and the City, which was produced from 1998 to 2004, and continues to run in syndicate. After the TV show ended, two movies came out: Sex and the City (2008) and Sex and the City 2 (2010). At the centre of the series were four women living in New York City, and the ups and downs of their romantic, professional, and interpersonal lives. McRobbie argues that the plot lines of the four main characters, while appearing to transgress norms of hegemonic femininity and heterosexuality, in fact serve to reinforce these norms through the ultimate, often sheepish, resolution of their
“transgressive” behaviours. For example, McRobbie (2008, 540) points to an episode where one of the main characters, Samantha, attempts a lesbian relationship, “which somehow invoked, by the end of the short affair, a heterosexual shudder, a kind of distaste and relief at returning to normality.” Of central concern to McRobbie is the focus that the show puts on shopping and consumption as the major mode through which the women connect with one another and themselves, finding meaning and relevance in their lives through their acts of consumerism. McRobbie (2008, 542) notes that, "The gender re-stabilization which occurs in Sex and the City is based on the ability of the girls to control the excess of femininity by reconciling it with more normative cultural practices, i.e. shopping and consumption. In this way the girls show themselves to be reassuringly real women.” McRobbie connects this idealization of women’s consumption to neoliberalism as a political and ideological rationality; the four main characters in the show, while espousing their feminist sensibilities through their claims to liberal freedoms and liberated sexuality, in fact comfortably reproduce the neoliberal emphasis on the individual consumer as the highest form of human development. Such a vision for humanity, echoed endlessly through popular culture, is one that many feminists have identified as frighteningly devoid of meaningful political engagement.

**[A] Gender and the War on Terror**

Feminist critiques of citizenship, democracy, and the state took a specific turn after the events of 11 September 2001, when two airplanes were flown into the World Trade Centre’s Twin Towers in New York City, bringing them to the ground in the largest terrorist attack ever conducted on American soil. A third plane was flown into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Almost 3000 people were killed and close to 9000 injured; the attacks led to widespread support for the resultant American-led “War on Terror” that eventually morphed into the US invasion of Iraq, and gave rise to Canada’s involvement in the UN supported war in Afghanistan. At the domestic level, the 9/11 attacks (as they came to be known) were used to justify the introduction of often draconian “security” legislation in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere. Critics have contended that such legislation is responsible for significant erosions in civil liberties, and resulted in racial profiling and the heightened surveillance of activists, among other problematic practices.
Feminists have raised concerns about some of the gendered and racialized elements of the new security state and the “war on terror.” Iris Marion Young (2003) critiques the post 9/11 security state for its masculinist underpinnings, arguing that the gendered logic that supports the presumption of its (masculine) role as “protector” of citizens, helps illuminate the meaning and appeal of the security state. The problem with this attribution is that it equates citizens with dependents and subordinates, making it difficult for citizens to challenge the actions of the state, as equals. Various feminist scholars have also interrogated how support for women’s freedom and the promotion of liberal sexuality have been used to justify an anti-Muslim war fought on various fronts—through immigration, international development work, media appeals, and torture practices in Guantanamo Bay (Butler 2009; Nguyen 2011; Pham 2011; Puar 2007).

As one example of how gendered logics, war, and Western ideologies intersect, Mimi Thi Nguyen (2011) describes the work of the non-governmental organization Beauty Without Borders, formed after the 9/11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan. Framed as a humanitarian effort to “restore self-esteem” and “liberate” Afghan women from the constraints of Taliban-enforced restrictions on women’s attire, the organization provides Afghan women with beauty tips and salon treatments. They opened the Kabul Beauty School in the capital city of Kabul, Afghanistan in 2003. As Nguyen (2011, 367) notes, “In the familiar oppositions that organize such thinking [behind the Beauty School], the burqa operates as anti-civilizational, a life-negating deindividuation that renders the Afghan woman passive and unwhole, while beauty acts as a life-affirming pathway to modern, even liberated, personhood.” The problem with such a dichotomy is that it smuggles in Western, neoliberal concepts of individuality and consumerism as inherently more worthy, good, and “beautiful” than any others. It also prioritizes individualized self-esteem and dignity as being at the foreground of efforts to restore human rights, rather than, for instance, the elimination of global structural inequalities or institutional barriers to women’s participation in education or the work place. Finally, it focuses on hegemonic forms of femininity as the means by which Afghan women might build their self-esteem—rather than focusing on their accomplishments or capacities, the Kabul Beauty School suggests that Afghan women will feel better about themselves with a makeover.
Within the Canadian context, feminists have argued that the “war on terror” has precipitated new and heightened concerns about the balance between multiculturalism and individual liberal rights. Conservative commentators have positioned multiculturalism as a potential threat to public safety inasmuch as it permits cultural minority groups to bring otherwise ‘intolerable’ values into Canadian society (Abu-Laban 2002). This debate quickly takes on gendered and racialized overtones, crystallizing around concerns about the veiling of women and so-called “honour killings.” As Eve Haque (2010, 79) notes, “Muslim women’s bodies…become the battlegrounds which clearly demarcate the line between the civilized secular modern nation and premodern religious fundamentalisms.” When the federal government banned women appearing veiled when taking the oath of Canadian citizenship, they fashioned themselves as saving them from their ‘tribal’ heritage, as Xiaohan Xu describes.

BOX INSERT STARTS HERE

**Making Freedom ‘Mandatory’ for Veiled Women: Reflection on Gender, Race, and Citizenship**

Xiaohan Xu  
MA Student, Sociology, Carleton University

On December 12, 2011 the Government of Canada placed a ban on face coverings for Muslim women taking the oath of citizenship. Those who wear niqab or other face-covering garments have to lift or remove their veils at their citizenship ceremony. Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney stated in an interview that taking the citizenship oath is an applicant’s public declaration of loyalty to Canada and must be done openly and freely:

>It is a matter of deep principle that goes to the heart of Canada’s identity and the country’s value of openness and equality. The tribal cultures which force women to cover their faces tend to treat women like property rather than human beings. I don’t think we want to lend the legitimacy of the Canadian state to that practice. We want women to be full and equal members of Canadian society and certainly when they’re taking the citizenship oath, that’s the right place to start (CBC News 2011).

A prime value of sociological knowledge is that it offers ‘thinking tools’ with which we can call into question ideas and practices that otherwise appear given to us. Canada’s ban
on face veils, for example, can no longer be read simply as rules to specify acceptable conduct at citizenship ceremonies when we place the issue within the sociology of gender relations: What kind of gender relations are at play here? What does it tell us about the governing of veiled women and of racialized women in general?

By drawing on discourses of barbaric cultures and patriarchal regimes that oppress women, a politics of comparison constructs Canada as defined by liberty and equality. Canada’s democratic values of freedom and gender equality, however, are not something to be enjoyed by all peoples, but have to be enforced through the identification and regulation of gendered and racialized bodies deemed to lack these values. This is exemplified by the state’s decision to make it mandatory for Muslim women to remove their face veils at citizenship ceremonies in order to obtain Canadian citizenship. It is to say, to become a Canadian citizen, one must comply with “the country’s value of openness and equality” – in this case it requires veiled women to take off their veils, which is supposedly a demonstration of freedom. What we see here is a gendered state-citizen relation articulated in the form of ‘masculinist protection’ (Young 2003). By enacting a law as though it is to protect veiled women from male domination, the Canadian state is taking a role similar to that of the benevolent masculine protector toward members of his patriarchal household. Masculinist protection by the state is often difficult to resist (if not desirable) for it is offered to the citizens in the name of fundamental democratic values. Canada’s ban on face veils is an instance where some of our most cherished ideals—freedom, gender equality, and full membership to our society—are invoked to justify the exercise of coercion and disguise the production of a subjugated citizenship.


While such struggles have played out in various ways across Canada, they have surfaced with particular vehemence in the province of Quebec. The latest wave of controversy began in 2010, when Naema Ahmed, an Egyptian-born pharmacist, was expelled from French language instruction classes in Quebec because she was wearing a niqab, a version of the hijab that covers the entire face of a woman, excepting her eyes (Golnaraghi and Mills 2013; Stasiulis 2013). Her expulsion was supported by the Quebec government, who soon tabled Bill 94, requiring that an individual’s face be exposed when interacting with government workers, including in health, education, social services, and daycare. The Bill, which clearly targets the small minority of Muslim women who wear the niqab, has “serious implications for civic engagement and employment equity, creating potentially new boundaries to Muslim women’s ability to participate, let alone play a role, in organizational life” (Golnaraghi and Mills 2013, 158). Daiva Stasiulis analyzes policies such as Bill 94, and the earlier “life standards” code of conduct for immigrants issued by the small Quebec town of Herouxville in 2007, as instances of “new moral discourses of citizenship” (2013, 184) in Quebec. She argues that such moral discourses suggest that “good citizenship on the part of newcomers and religious/racialized minorities requires re-calibration of [an] individual’s personal morality to suit the moral tastes of the majority, thus disguising embedded hierarchies in access to full citizenship” (Stasiulis 2013, 184). That such hierarchies are gendered is not difficult to see—the focus has been largely on women and their attire, with discourse that emulates the post 9/11 “war on terror” position that Muslim women need to be liberated through Western interventions and standards of beauty.

In 2013, the then-ruling Parti Quebecois introduced a controversial Secular Charter of Values that forbade public servants from wearing “conspicuous religious symbols” in the workplace, and also reiterated the requirement of Bill 94 that an individual’s face be uncovered when interacting with government workers. While “discreet” religious symbols, such as rings or small pendants, were exempt, hijab, niqab, kippah, and turbans were to be banned. Also exempt were large crosses in public government offices and the practice of Christmas, on the basis that these were part of the province’s cultural heritage.
Such inconsistencies led critics to assert that the bill was hypocritical and racist, celebrating Christianity while abolishing all other forms of religious expression. As with the earlier controversies over the niqab in 2010, the major focus of the public debate was on women’s attire and whether Muslim women were fundamentally oppressed through the covering of their faces and hair. Largely ignored in the public discussion were the voices of Muslim women themselves, denouncing the Quebec government’s paternalism and asking that their religious and cultural beliefs be respected. The Bill was ultimately defeated when the Parti Quebecois lost the 2014 provincial election.

[A] How do alternate forms of citizenship position gender?

Thus far in the chapter, we have discussed feminist critiques of mainstream forms of citizenship in liberal democratic or settler states. We have looked at feminist analyses that have revealed the embedded masculinist assumptions behind liberal citizenship, including the belief in a rational, independent subject (coded as male, and which has often been situated in opposition to the emotional, dependent subject, coded as female). We have considered the myth of a transparent division between the public and private spheres, and examined the racial categories that underlie normative Canadian citizenship. We have also considered the effects of other social categories such as social class, dis/ability, sexuality, and age on citizenship rights and entitlements. Finally, we have looked at feminist critiques of both neoliberalism and the more recent intensification of the security state. In the section that follows, we will look at some alternate forms of citizenship, many of which are posited as direct challenges to the problematic elements of normative Canadian citizenship identified above, and ask: how do they position gender and the complexity of gendered intersections?

[B] Sexual citizenship

On 24 January 2011, an officer from the Toronto Police Services suggested that women could avoid being sexually assaulted by not “dressing like sluts.” The remark came as part of a campus community safety information session held at Osgoode Hall, the law school for York University in Toronto. The comment triggered a massive grassroots
outcry in Toronto and around the world, and the first SlutWalk, held in Toronto on 3 April 2011, was soon followed by similar marches across the US, as well as in Brazil, Poland, the United Kingdom, Israel, India, and Australia. The organizers of the Toronto SlutWalk state that the use of the term “slut” belongs to a long history of shaming women for their sexuality, and creates a “chilly climate” for women who have been sexually assaulted, who may fear reporting the crime to police if they expect to be blamed for it.

As noted on the Toronto SlutWalk website:

> We are tired of being oppressed by slut-shaming; of being judged by our sexuality and feeling unsafe as a result. Being in charge of our sexual lives should not mean that we are opening ourselves to an expectation of violence, regardless if we participate in sex for pleasure or work. No one should equate enjoying sex with sexual assault.

The global emergence of the SlutWalks is one example of the upsurge of what various theorists have termed “sexual citizenship,” which Jeffrey Weeks describes as “a claim to inclusion, to the acceptance of diversity, and a recognition of and respect for alternative ways of being, to a broadening of the definition of belonging” based in sexual politics (1998, 37). Such claims are predicated on elements of the social world that have been historically relegated to the private sphere—the erotic and the sexual—which are now, uniquely, staking a claim in the public sphere of citizenship (Weeks 1998). Both feminist and GLBTQ movements have been instrumental in moving sexual citizenship out of the closet (so to speak) and into the public world of claims to rights and entitlements.

Sexual citizenship is gendered in a number of ways. As the SlutWalk demonstrates, women are reclaiming derogatory sexualized language in order to assert their right to be sexually active and be protected from sexual violence. Mimi Schippers (2007) identifies “slut” as one of the “pariah femininities” that challenges hegemonic masculinity and femininity. The “slut” is so-called because she has challenged the gender norm of submissive and modest female sexuality; the closest equivalent term for men is the “jigolo,” which contains connotations of virility and sexual ardor and thus does not carry nearly the same degree of approbation. In celebrating sluthood, the SlutWalks are attempting to flip this gendered division on its head, by saying “women are sexual beings
and that’s awesome!” and also, “women are sexual beings and that doesn’t mean they want to be raped!”

The enactment of sexual citizenship by GLBTQ communities is also inherently gendered, due to the tight connection between sexuality and gender (discussed above). When two men hold hands in public in Canada, they are committing an act of sexual citizenship. Their seemingly simple act challenges deeply embedded norms of gendered behaviour, which includes heterosexuality. Such an act is still seen as a gender transgression, despite progress made in recent years to protect the rights of GLBTQ people, and it can still lead to violence against the men in question. For example, in 2009, Erik Rozenski and his boyfriend were attacked in London, Ontario as they walked home together holding hands after an evening out.xii

Brenda Cossman (2002) has analyzed GLBTQ rights to sexual citizenship within the Canadian context and drawn important connections to the macro-context of neoliberalism (discussed above). In a comparison between the expansion of same-sex marriage rights and the battles waged by Little Sisters’ bookstore in Vancouver against censorship by the Canadian Border Services Agency (who regularly confiscate books and magazines bound for this GLBTQ bookstore), Cossman suggests that “the struggle for recognition…has been successful only to the extent that sexual citizens have been prepared to reconstitute themselves as privatized, depoliticized, and de-eroticized subjects” (2002, 484). She sees this as continuous with the neoliberal emphasis on self-reliance, self-governance, and free markets. While acknowledging that sexual citizenship may now be extended beyond the heterosexual community, Cossman is concerned that challenges to the dominant ideology of sex and sexuality—as belonging within partnered relationships and to be contained to the bedroom—are bound for failure. “Sexual citizenship,” she writes, “for queer bodies, requires a redrawing of the boundaries between good and bad sex, between obscene and onscreen. Sexual citizenship for these erotically charged bodies requires that the inside of citizenship no longer demand that the pulsating, pleasure-driven body be checked at the door” (2002, 496).

[C]Indigenous citizenship
The question of citizenship within the Canadian context becomes even more complicated when we consider the experiences of Indigenous communities. Treaties originally negotiated with the British Crown protect Indigenous rights to ongoing access to their land, as well as to additional services like health and education, in exchange for British land use. As James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson (2002) argues, the fact that colonial policies and racism have undermined these treaty rights in practice does not extinguish their ongoing relevance. Henderson contends that “the offerings of statutory citizenship for Aboriginal peoples inverts rather than respects the constitutional relationship” (2002, 415), asking Indigenous peoples to further assimilate to Canadian norms of a single unitary citizenship, rather than the shared sovereignties negotiated under the treaties. In other words, normative Canadian citizenship cannot simply be extended, trouble-free, to Indigenous peoples, due to the danger it poses of simply further assimilating Indigenous peoples to dominant norms, and potentially overlooking their previously negotiated treaty rights. On the other hand, substantive citizenship rights to housing, welfare, and education, for example, have been systematically denied to Indigenous peoples through a range of colonialist policies, and the ongoing result has been the impoverishment and neglect of Indigenous communities. Thus the claims of Indigenous peoples to rights and protections are very complicated; while a simple extension of normative citizenship might cause more damage than good, their rights have been thoroughly ignored for so many years that claims to citizenship entitlements may well be the best recourse they have to redress past wrongs.

Canadian citizenship for Indigenous women is even more fraught. Excluded from first wave feminist fights for suffrage, and positioned as “less than” Indigenous men by such colonial policies as the federal Indian Act, Indigenous women have been repeatedly marginalized in contemporary understandings of citizenship (Lindberg 2004). Uneasily aligned with feminist struggles for gender equality, Indigenous women, like many racialized women, recognize the benefits of these battles, but also find them problematic in that they overlook the specificities of their experiences from within Indigenous communities (which include men). As Tracy Lindberg remarks: “they [Canadian feminists] do not understand the thousands of years of interaction where we lived well with our men prior to their two hundred years on our soil, and they do not suffer the same
oppression to the same degree that Indigenous women have suffered it. What if their equal does not equal my equal?” (2004, 346).

One of the most concrete and devastating ways in which Indigenous women’s entitlements to the rights and protections of citizenship continue to be undermined is through their ongoing experiences of sexual and physical violence; hundreds of Indigenous women have either gone missing or have been murdered across Canada. The Native Women’s Association of Canada notes that the number of murdered and missing Aboriginal women in Canada is disproportionately high, representing approximately ten per cent of female homicides across Canada despite Aboriginal women making up only three per cent of the population. They also point out that the vast majority of murdered and missing women were mothers. The loss of these women thus creates an intergenerational tragedy, as very little is known of what happens to their children. Finally, they note that the majority of the cases involve women under the age of 31, meaning that young women are particularly vulnerable.

Far from being silent on this issue, Indigenous women have organized in multiple powerful and politically salient ways to fight these ongoing inequalities. Perhaps best known are the Women’s Memorial Marches for murdered and missing women that take place every Valentine’s Day (14 February) in the Downtown Eastside (DTES) in Vancouver, with companion marches taking place in many cities across the country. The DTES (also known as the poorest urban postal code in Canada) is the location where many Indigenous women have gone missing over the years, particularly those involved in the sex trade. As noted in a press release by the March organizers for the 2013 event:

The February 14th Annual Women’s Memorial March is held on Valentine’s Day each year to honour the memory of women from the Downtown Eastside who have died due to physical, mental, emotional and spiritual violence. Now in its 22nd year, the march brings courage and commitment to remember and honour murdered and missing women, and to end the violence that vulnerable women in the DTES face on a daily basis.

Another important Indigenous social movement is the Idle No More movement, which first emerged in 2012. It is particularly significant for our discussion here, as it has largely been led by women and young people across Canada (Graveline 2012). Begun by
four Indigenous women in Saskatchewan—Nina Wilson, Sylvia McAdam, Jessica Gordon and Sheelah McLean—it originated in response to an omnibus bill introduced by the Harper Conservatives that was poised to make changes to 64 different acts and regulations, including the Indian Act, the Navigable Waters Protection Act, the Environmental Assessment Act, and the Fisheries Act (Graveline 2012). The movement was quickly taken up across the country and continues to be active today, despite the fact that efforts to stop the omnibus bill from passing were unsuccessful.

The Idle No More movement, besides being started by women and continued by other women and young people, can also be analyzed more broadly with the help of a gendered lens. In describing her commitment to the movement, Frye Jean Graveline explicitly positions her involvement with the movement as her particular responsibility as a woman:

> For me, and many other Aboriginal women, involvement in Idle No More is a heartfelt, historic and cultural need to rise and defend the waters and lands. As Aboriginal women, we have a spiritual duty and a daily lived responsibility, to care for and nurture the waters, the womb of our Earth Mother. These responsibilities are linked to our roles as life-givers and caretakers of the generations to come. [Graveline 2012, 296]

A gendered lens can also be helpful in making sense of the mainstream response to the Idle No More movement, as represented in major Canadian media outlets. One of the most widely publicised acts connected to the emergence of the movement was the hunger strike undertaken by Chief Theresa Spence, leader of the Attawapiskat First Nation. Chief Spence began her hunger strike to bring attention to the dire state of housing infrastructure in Attawapiskat, as well as to support the goals of the Idle No More movement. She consumed water, lemon water, and fish broth, in keeping with the liquid diet that is common to hunger strikers. Specialists speculated that her daily caloric intake ranged from between 50 and 1000 calories a day (Kirkey, 2013), well below the daily requirement of 2000 calories for an adult woman. Rather than treating her hunger strike as a political statement with political goals, much was made in mainstream Canadian media about Chief Spence’s appearance, and how a hunger strike might actually be helpful to her in losing weight. This excerpt from a commentary in the National Post, written by Canadian journalist Barbara Kay (2013), is typical:
Fish broth is a very low-calorie food, but it is highly nutritious, and I daresay a great deal healthier than the Chief’s regular regime, which I am going to assume from her appearance includes a lot of carbohydrates. I am not actually encouraging Chief Spence to go on a real starvation regime. I am only saying that at this rate, it is going to take her a very long time to get the job done—if that is indeed what she wants. Meanwhile, she may actually end up doing her body a favour.

The “get the job done” statement made by Kay suggests that Spence’s goal is to starve herself to death—completely overlooking the stated goals of her hunger strike, while also denigrating the historical practice of hunger striking in general (for example, Mahatma Gandhi made use of hunger strikes as a powerful political tool in his efforts to fight against British imperialism and caste segregation in India in the 1930s). But the most pernicious element of this common response to Chief Spence’s hunger strike by mainstream Canadian media outlets was essentially a gendered one: through a “fat shaming” technique designed to denigrate Chief Spence’s practice as that of an overweight woman trying to reduce her size, the important message and political goals of Chief Spence’s actions, and those of the Idle No More movement that she represented, were derided and dismissed. This is continuous with the “chilly climate” for women in the public sphere, discussed above, where women’s political acts are reduced to weight-loss strategies and their body sizes become the subject of public ridicule.

Kent Monkman has made the gendered elements of Canadian citizenship, and their relation to Indigenous peoples’ experiences under colonialism, the subject of many of his artistic endeavours. A Canadian artist of Cree ancestry, Monkman has produced artistic works that highlight the implicit gendering of Indigenous and non-Indigenous citizenship under colonialism. Using his alter-ego, Miss Chief Eagle Testickle, Monkman challenges the literal erasure of Indigenous peoples from European images of North America. By playfully invoking his gender-bending alter-ego, Monkman draws on pre-contact Indigenous traditions of Two-Spirited people, who were thought to contain both male and female aspects and were highly respected as healers and leaders. Miss Chief is placed ironically in relation to historical white figures, and is able to reveal the gendered and colonial assumptions that are otherwise not readily visible. For example, in a 2010
touring exhibition titled “The Triumph of Mischief,” Monkman created large-scale paintings of erotic encounters between “cowboys” and “Indians,” and combined these with film, photography, and theatrical performance. Miss Chief played ringmaster, using her role to mock and contradict historically assumed attitudes about the relationship between Indigenous peoples and European colonizers. By turning hegemonic gender, heterosexual dominance, and white dominance on their heads, Monkman’s work reveals the interstices between gender, sexuality, Indigenous cultures, inclusion, and belonging.

[A]The gendering of youth citizenship

This chapter has now covered a lot of theoretical ground: outlining feminist theories and critiques of citizenship and the state, offering alternatives to citizenship, and attempting to provide concrete examples that illustrate some of the complex interconnections revealed by an intersectional approach. This final section synthesizes some of these strands in a discussion of young women’s civic engagement (specifically that of teenagers and women in their early-to-mid twenties) in Canada and elsewhere, and concretizes some of the theoretical concepts related to the intersections between gender, class, race, age, ability and sexuality that have been discussed above.

One aspect of young women’s civic engagement that deserves examination is the gendered pressure on young women to perform particular kinds of “acceptable” citizenship (such as neoliberal consumer citizenship) that may, in fact, curtail those forms of civic engagement that challenge state power. Some of this pressure is exerted from within state institutions, most notably through the educational system, but it also comes from other institutional sites, like the media. Age operates inextricably with gender in this regard, as, for example, most young women are required to attend educational institutions where they are exposed to these particular messages about “appropriate” citizenship. The intersection between social categories—gender, race, class, and age, among others—and their complex relation to institutions shape the civic field, and define some young women as more “naturally” enabled to participate in civic structures and/or activism, while others are not expected to engage at all; this, too, is seen as “natural.”
In the first part of this section, we will examine some of the institutional constraints faced by young women and the impact they have on young women’s civic engagement.

**Institutional constraints on young women’s civic engagement**

In a recent study undertaken by Jackie and her colleague Kristina Llewellyn, the language of civics curricula across three Canadian provinces were found to “camouflage the manner in which the ‘active citizen’ of twenty-first century civics is not a universally accessible model available to all young people” (2011, 908). Based on a critical discourse analysis of three provincial curricular documents (one each from BC, Ontario, and Alberta), they conclude that “masculinist biases … remain within citizenship concepts [and] disenfranchise[] certain forms of participation within the nation-state, including those that emerge through relationality or take place in the private sphere” (Kennelly and Llewellyn 2011, 911). This is significant given that “education unquestionably acts as a cultural agent through which acceptable behaviour may be defined” (900). They further link the hidden ideology of the curricula to neoliberal priorities, noting that “[a]ctive citizenship is consistently coupled with cautions about the importance of compliant behaviour (i.e. ethics, duty and responsibility) and silenced from seemingly ‘inappropriate’ participation in civic dissent” (903). Rather than promoting an “active” citizen who might participate in challenges to wider injustices (including those coming from the state), Kennelly and Llewellyn suggest that students are being encouraged to become rational, responsible, self-regulating citizens who comply with state norms and do not seek to undermine state policies. These findings highlight the ongoing gendering of citizenship curricula, which continue to privilege the rational and self-reliant subject that is congruent with hegemonic masculinity, while undervaluing the elements of selfhood that have been traditionally associated with femininity—relationships, nurturance, and family life.

While the effect of such curricular documents on young women’s participation in the civic realm cannot be determined through a discourse analysis (and this was not the aim of our study), the language of the documents does highlight the cultural norms that are being transmitted through contemporary schooling. Similar research about civics
curricula in the US between 1990 and 2003 suggests that “Citizenship as practiced in schools is predominantly taught as civic republican literacy (factual consumption of American history, geography, and government), combined with varying degrees of patriotic identity and the liberal virtue of tolerance for difference” (Abowitz and Harnish 2006, 680). It does not, as a matter of course, engage with critical, feminist, queer, and transnational discourses of citizenship that might expand the inclusion of non-White students, female students, and queer students. In a 2012 study, Canadian scholar Rebecca Raby examines the effect of school rules and codes of conduct on student engagement and their sense of inclusion and well-being within schools and in society, more generally. One conclusion she draws from her ethnographic study is that the imposition of top-down rules-based regimes, in which students have little voice or decision-making power, is pervasive in Ontario schools. Unfortunately, this context serves to “dampen students’ sense of themselves as present and future participants in the society around them” (Raby 2012, 247).

Schooling is undoubtedly an important socializing institution for young people, but it is not the only one. Various feminist scholars have noted that young people’s citizenship has become strongly associated with broader neoliberal pressures towards individualization and consumption. Many suggest that this has been felt with particular intensity by young women. As Anita Harris contends, today’s young women are expected to “take their place” in society “through their personal competencies and from a sense of their responsibilities to the social world” (2004, 72). Consequently, women are increasingly positioned as the new success stories under neoliberalism, with their culturally-configured flexibility, responsibilization, and adaptability (Baker 2010; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001). Yet, simultaneously, young women are overburdened with the pressures of neoliberal responsibilization; as Stéphanie Genz argues, young women are faced with “the mixed messages and conflicting demands of a neoliberal consumer culture that offers women both freedom and enslavement” (2006, 347).

One site through which such messages are transmitted is television media, including programming intended primarily for girls. Even shows that are ostensibly committed to “girl power,” attempting to portray girls and young women as empowered
agents in their own right, are subject to the constraints of dominant patriarchal and consumer culture paradigms. In an analysis of the tween show *The Powerpuff Girls*, Lisa Hager concludes that the main characters “are mouthpieces for a pseudo-feminism that undercuts any feminist challenge to patriarchal authority by asserting that sexism no longer exists and everyone is now equal” and that they are, “in the end, tools of the State” (2008, 74). Likewise, Sarah Banet-Weiser (2004), argues that “girl power” shows on the US children’s network Nickelodeon represent a form of feminist ethos, “where empowerment and agency define girls more than helplessness and dependence.” However, she continues, “this empowerment is represented as an individual choice, and at times resembles other commercial choices we all make” (Banet-Weiser 2004, 136).

**[B] Young people’s activism in a complex social world**

Studies such as those described above paint a picture of schooling and other cultural sites as spaces that restrict, rather than expand, civic involvement, based on very traditional notions of what constitutes citizenship and democratic engagement. In light of this context, it is perhaps a minor miracle that young people today engage in any form of civic participation, and particularly in those that break from restrictive norms of citizenship. But engage they do. Jessica Taft’s 2011 study of teenage girl activists across five cities in the Americas (San Francisco’s Bay Area, Mexico City, Caracas, Vancouver, and Buenos Aires) documents, in beautiful ethnographic detail, the multitude of activist projects undertaken by her young participants. From protesting state repression in Mexico to reporting on labour politics in Vancouver; from shouting down Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to running soup kitchens in Argentina, the young women of Taft’s study are critically engaged in a wide range of activist projects that both resist state injustices and provide alternatives to mainstream initiatives. In Jackie’s (Kennelly 2011) ethnographic research on youth activism across Canada’s three largest cities (Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal), she found young people engaged in activist projects designed to confront the state: in anti-poverty, anti-globalization, anti-colonial, and anti-war activism. Hava Gordon’s (2010) study of youth activism in the United States likewise documents the ongoing participation of young women in activist projects designed to challenge state norms and neoliberalism.
Thus, despite institutional pressures to do otherwise, young people are engaged in radical forms of civic involvement that do not simply uphold the mainstream messages conveyed by cultural and state institutions. This does not, however, mean that their participation is untroubled by larger issues of social inequality that intersect along lines of gender, class, race, sexuality, and ability.

For young female activists, gender (as a defining social category) often looms large in their experiences—even if they, themselves, do not always articulate it as such. Hava Gordon (2010) found that young women engaged in activist projects in the US have been circumscribed by their gendered position in specific ways: either because parents would not let them participate in the same activities as their male compatriots, or because they perceived themselves to be less capable of, or less committed to, activist projects due to their caution regarding “riskier” activist activities (like confronting police at protests or participating in night-time events). Jessica Taft found that the girls in her study had to negotiate a quagmire of gendered ideas about themselves as girls *and* as activists. She notes:

Collectively and individually, girl activists simultaneously remake and reject girlhood. On the one hand, many of them say that they are still sometimes ‘just a girl’ and like to do ‘girly things,’ and that there are some aspects of girlhood that enhance their activism and social movement participation. But on the other hand, these same girls suggest that becoming activists means that they are no longer girls and that the traits of girlhood and the traits of activism are diametrically opposed to one another. [2011, 72]

Other scholars have noted the manner in which activism has been coded as a masculine prerogative (Coleman and Bassi 2011; Conway 2011; Sullivan 2005), meaning that girls and women have had to carve out a specific place for themselves in activist cultures (unless they are participating in feminist activism). In Jackie’s (Kennelly, 2014) analysis of young women’s gendered experiences in anti-state activism, she suggests that a combination of neoliberal subjectivity and sedimented gender norms have resulted in young women bearing a disproportionate burden of the “caring work” attached to activism, when compared to their male colleagues. Such a burden can overwhelm young women, ultimately leading to them burning-out and leaving behind activist work.
altogether.

Young people of colour face the additional legacy of racism in their activist work. Jackie’s (2011) study revealed that young men and women of colour often felt less assured of their “place” in activist subcultures in Canada, which were largely white-dominated, and Jo-Anne Lee’s research into the experiences of young women of colour in Victoria, BC, suggests that girls successfully “live under whiteness” by acquiring “cultural knowledge for negotiating multiple and unequal social worlds” (2005, 62). Similarly, young women and men from working class or impoverished families struggle to find a place in Canadian activist subcultures, which are often middle class in their orientations, despite their efforts to fight economic inequality (Kennelly 2011).

As Jessica Azevedo sets out, the complexities of some young women’s lives inspire new forms of political activism.

BOX INSERT STARTS HERE

Crippling Resistance: The Politics of Jes Sasche's and Loree Erickon's Porn/Erotica

By Jessica Azevedo
PhD Student, Sociology and Political Economy, Carleton University

How might we begin to theorize about gender as it relates to agency and activism—especially since gender shapes and is shaped by sexuality, class, age, race, and dis/ability? As a queer feminist interested in the ways young people participate in transformative politics, I think a useful starting point to do so is by recognizing the creative ways in which individuals and/or groups engage in resisting the status quo.

For my own research, I found an intersectional queer feminist approach beneficial in examining the work of two activists, artists and academics who reside in Canada named Loree Erickson and Jes Sachse. Such a particular sociological approach, aims to acknowledge and valorize the 'non-normative', diverse and fluid ways queer youth participate in autonomy and activism. Jes Sasche's and Lorree Erickson's use erotic/pornographic pictures and videos seek to (re)conceptualize and reclaim their dis/abled identities, bodies, genders and sexualities. Their utilization of
pornography/erotica as a site to carry out their politics may not fall under dominant definitions of activism. However, Sachse's and Erickson's work do have political implications. Such becomes evident when interrogating how gender, age, sexuality, and dis/ability are implicated in processes of subjectification as interconnecting forces of power and inequality.

For example, the ways in which certain bodies, gender expressions and sexualities-especially women's bodies and sexualities-have been demonized, immoralized and inferiorized has a long and complex history (Clare 2009). Moreover, because of the complexities surrounding dis/abled identities and identifications, many dis/ability scholars and activists have found theoretical and analytical relevance in queer theory-forming what is known as crip theory.

Crip theory is attentive to the normalizing and regulatory effects of hegemony, such as heteronormativity, heterosexism, and able-bodiedness. Crip theory attempts to investigate how these structures are intertwined: particularly the relationship between able-bodiedness and compulsory heterosexuality (McGruer 2006). Also, the notion of crip highlights the interconnectedness between gender, sexuality, dis/ability and the body, and seeks to explore the fluidity of identities (Shildrik, 2009). For Erikson and Sachse, crip is a word that both these activists/artists reclaim as part of their identity formation, and use it as a conceptual space to create new forms of cultural production.

For instance, Erickson expands on redefining the concept of crip by considering intersections of dis/ability and gender. She argues that "crip", or as she also calls "gimp" intersect and intertwine with femmeness, becoming a femmegimp body and identity that resists the pressure to feel shame for its disordliness" (2007, 44). Sachse's work is similar in reclaiming her dis/ability as it intersects with her sexuality. Sachse, who has a "rare condition known as Freeman-Sheldon Syndrome and has scoliosis which curves the spine" embraces the notion of crip in redefining “what is sexy and desirable” (Rolston 2009, 5). Therefore these artist/activists recognize their dis/abled bodies as queer bodies and thus a site in which the politics of reclamation and subversion is enacted.

Resistance to the moralizing and regulatory effects of patriarchal, heteronormative, heterosexist and ableist ideologies is evident throughout both Sachse's and Erickson's work. In asking why are Sachse and Erickson committed to sexualizing
dis/abled women's bodies through pornographic/erotic film and photography, we not only see a continuation of queer, feminist and sex-radical reclamation of porn, but also the creation of an alternative and politicized space for dis/abled bodies to validate their own crip sensabilities.

*To see some of the work of Loree Erickson, visit this link:*

http://femmegimp.org/

*To see some of the work of Jes Sasche, visit the following links:*

http://hollynorris.ca/americanaable#h39067524

http://www.envisioningnewmeanings.ca/?page_id=40


BOX INSERT ENDS HERE

[A]Conclusion

This chapter began with an historical example of women’s relationship to citizenship and belonging in Canada—the famous five “persons case”—that illustrated some of the struggles and tensions faced by first wave feminists in their fight for recognition as competent individuals capable of bearing the rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship. Using feminist analyses to explore the very concept of “citizenship” reveals
some of the tensions underlying contemporary meanings particularly in the context of liberal democratic or settler societies. These theoretical insights help us make sense of significant gender inequalities in the political realm such as women’s continued marginalization within formal politics. But gender, as an axis of analysis, can only reveal part of the picture; an intersectional approach enables us to consider how other social categories interact to perpetuate inequality in the realms of social inclusion and citizenship. Intersectionality was shown to have relevance for racialized citizenship, and other forms of exclusion, including those based in social class, dis/ability, sexuality, and age.

Considerations of citizenship, and the impact of intersectionality, also direct our attention to macro political-economic processes and how these shape the inequalities affecting how Canadians live their lives. In particular, the ideological influence of neoliberalism, the rise of the security state, and the “war on terror” are having a profound effect on the gendered and intersectional designations of who does and does not belong, and indeed of what “belonging” means. As possible alternatives to mainstream citizenship, we considered concepts such as sexual citizenship and Indigenous citizenship. We also looked at young women’s activism, recognizing that young people work within and across intersectional divisions to challenge inequality and oppression. Today they do so within the highly complex influences of neoliberalism, providing both challenges to and inspiration for young people’s activist engagements in Canada and elsewhere.

[A]Research Questions

1. Conduct research into different eras of women’s involvement in formal electoral politics, perhaps starting with the “person’s case,” then moving to the first woman to serve on the Senate, the first female Member of Parliament, and recent efforts to bring more women into political life. What are some of the similarities between their struggles in these different eras? What are some of the differences? How
might you account for these similarities and differences sociologically, and using an intersectional lens?

2. Find media coverage of a recent social movement that has involved young people, and young women in particular. How are the young people portrayed in the media? You could try conducting a systematic discourse analysis, where (for example) you analyze every adjective that is attached to young activists, and/or look at the images that are used to portray these social movements. What messages do they convey?

3. Design a study to investigate differences between how young men and young women connect with gender politics.

[A]Discussion Questions

1. In your view, what are acts of citizenship? Do they include voting? Protesting? Helping a family member? Which of these do you participate in? How are each of these gendered?

2. What does it mean to you to ‘be a Canadian’? How are dominant ideas of ‘being Canadian’ gendered, raced, and/or classed?

3. How does the history of racism in Canada connect with gender oppression and inequality?

4. Have you ever witnessed or been the victim of “slut shaming?” How might you respond to this in a way that makes use of strategies of sexual citizenship?

[A]Further Reading

make up the past, present, and future of the Idle No More movement.


[A]Films

[http://www.virtualvisit.learnalberta.ca/content/ssvv/en/thefamousfive.html](http://www.virtualvisit.learnalberta.ca/content/ssvv/en/thefamousfive.html) includes embedded videos about two of the Famous Five, Emily Murphy and Nellie McClung.

*Social Activism 2.0 - How Citizens Are Standing Up for Democracy* (Moyers & Company 2012)

This edition of Moyers & Company talks with young activists involved in a nationwide initiative in the USA called the 99% Spring.

*Unlock the Intelligence, Passion, and Greatness of Girls* (2013)

A TEDTalk by Nobel Peace Prize winner Leymah Gbowee, a women’s movement leader and peace activist in Liberia. She asks: can we transform the world by unlocking the greatness of girls?
Discordia (2004)
It's September 9, 2002, and a scheduled appearance by Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Israeli prime minister, has sparked heated debate at Montreal's Concordia University. By the end of the day, the "Concordia riot" has made international news, from CNN to Al-Jazeera. Discordia follows three young campus activists and documents that eventful day.

[A]Websites

http://www.slutwalktoronto.com Slut Walk Toronto, the website for the original Slut Walk, with announcements about upcoming events, a twitter feed, and a blog.

http://www.idlenomore.ca Idle No More: the home site for the Idle No More movement, with stories, history, and calls to action to support Indigenous sovereignty.

http://kentmonkman.com Kent Monkman's website (Cree-Canadian artist), with samples of his work.

http://youngfeministfund.org FRIDA, the young feminist fund, which provides information on funding opportunities for young feminist activists from around the world.

---

The Chinese Exclusion Act (formally called the Chinese Immigration Act) was passed federally in 1923 and was not repealed until 1947. It excluded the immigration of all Chinese nationals during this time, even if they were family members of Canadian citizens. While other immigrant groups were highly regulated, the Chinese were the only group to be excluded entirely based on racial categories. The Komagata Maru was a ship that travelled from Punjab, India to Vancouver, British Columbia in 1914, carrying 376 passengers, of whom 340 were Sikhs, 24 were Muslims, and 12 were Hindus. All were British subjects. Only 20 of them were admitted to Canada, and the other 356 were forced to return to India.